# T

**First, we meet- plan in a vacuum is topical because it is limited to reducing restrictions on OSW production**

**Second, counter-interpretation- On means the indicated focus or destination of an effort**

**Merriam Webster, no date**

[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on]

9a —**used as a function word to indicate destination or the focus of some action, movement, or directed effort** <crept up on him> <feast your eyes on this> <working on my skiing> <made a payment on the loan> b —used as a function word to indicate the focus of feelings, determination, or will <have pity on me> <keen on sports> <a curse on you> c —used as a function word to indicate the object with respect to some misfortune or disadvantageous event <the crops died on them> d —used as a function word to indicate the subject of study, discussion, or consideration <a book on insects> <reflect on that a moment> <agree on price> e : with respect to <go light on the salt> <short on cash>

**we meet- restrictions on leasing range from out-right bans to stipulations- NEPA review is right in the middle**

**USDI, USDA, DOE 2008**

[“Inventory of Onshore Federal Oil and Natural Gas Resources and Restrictions to Their Development”, <http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/MINERALS__REALTY__AND_RESOURCE_PROTECTION_/energy/0.Par.68195.File.dat/EPCA2008lo_1.pdf> //wyo-tjc]

2.3.1 Categorization of Oil and Gas Access Constraints The **main factors that affect access to oil and gas resources on Federal lands are land availability** (Section 2.1.1) **and leasing and drilling restrictions** (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). To simplify the analysis and present meaningful results, these factors were categorized into a hierarchy that represents varying levels of access as shown in Table 2-9. This categorization was necessary to enable a reasonable quantitative analysis, given the fact that approximately 3,125 individual stipulations from 128 Federal land use plans (LUPs) exist for the study areas within the Inventory. The hierarchy of categories was formulated to ensure that the constraints on oil and gas development could be appropriately assessed (especially for areas of multiple, overlapping stipulations), and to ensure that the cumulative impacts on access would be examined. In addition, the hierarchy was formulated based upon the accessibility of the lands for leasing, and for areas where leasing is permitted, the impacts relative to the difficulty for conducting drilling operations. **The Federal lands categorization hierarchy is ordered from “No Leasing” (most constrained) to “Leasing with Standard Lease Terms” (least constrained**) as follows: 1. **No Leasing (Statutory/Executive Order) (NLS) are lands that cannot be leased due to Congressional or Presidential action.** **Examples include national parks, national monuments, and wilderness areas**. **2. No Leasing (Administrative) (NLA) are lands that are withheld from leasing based on discretionary decisions made by the Federal land management agency**. The NLA areas can include endangered species habitat and historical sites. 3. **No Leasing (Administrative), Pending Land Use Planning or NEPA Compliance** (NLA/LUP) are **lands that have not yet undergone or are currently undergoing land use planning or NEPA analysis**, and that are generally not available for leasing. In the cases where there is no land use plan in effect, non-Federal mineral estate underlying Federal land is categorized as NLA/LUP to reflect the fact that access to mineral estate can be allowed through the NEPA process. 4. **Leasing, No Surface Occupancy** (NSO) (Net NSO for Oil & Gas Resources) **are lands that can be leased but ground-disturbing oil and natural gas exploration and development activities are prohibited**. These stipulations protect identified resources such as special status plant species habitat. Their surface areas are mapped as described by the LUPs. **However, at least some of the resources can be accessed by directional drilling** from nearby lands where surface occupancy is allowed. This is accounted for by creating an extended drilling zone (EDZ, as described in Appendix 9) that reduces the size of the NSO area. The area removed is then placed in the next most restrictive resource access category (5 through 9, below) that would otherwise apply in the absence of the NSO stipulation. Within the EDZ area the underlying resource is considered accessible even though the surface above it cannot be occupied by drilling equipment. After the EDZ is removed, the NSO area that remains is referred to as “Net NSO” (NNSO) and the resources under it are therefore considered inaccessible. 5. **Leasing, Cumulative Timing Limitations** (TLs) **on drilling of >9 Months are lands that can be leased, but stipulations and/or COAs limit the time of the year when oil and gas exploration and drilling can take place to less than 3 months**. Timing limitations prohibit surface use during specified time intervals to protect identified resources such as sage grouse habitat or elk calving areas. 6. **Leasing, Cumulative Timing Limitations** (TLs**) on drilling of >6 to ≤9 Months are lands that can be leased, but stipulations and/or COAs limit the time of the year when oil and gas exploration and drilling can take place from 3 to 6 months**. 7. **Leasing, Cumulative Timing Limitations** (TLs) **on drilling of >3 to ≤6 Months are lands that can be leased,** but stipulations and/or COAs limit the time of the year when **oil and gas exploration and drilling can take place from 6 to 9 month**s. 8. **Leasing, Controlled Surface Use** (CSU) are lands where **stipulations** and/or COAs **control the surface location of natural gas and oil exploration and development activities by excluding them from portions of the lease.** For example, a CSU stipulation could require an operator to develop a specialized mitigation plan based on the presence of moderately steep slopes. This category also includes the minimal areas that have timing limitations of less than three months. 9. **Leasing, Standard Lease Terms** (SLTs) areas are **lands that can be leased and where no additional stipulations are added to the standard lease form. Standard lease terms**, however, **still dictate that the lessee must comply with many environmental standards** and other requirements (see Section 2.1.2, above). Categorizations were made on the basis of LUPs and discussions with Federal land management agencies. In most cases categorization is relatively straightforward; in other cases judgments were made based upon experience with stipulation datasets. For the FS, FPs standards and guidelines are both included in the definition of “Management Direction” at 36 CFR 219.3 (Forest Planning), and were used synonymously without distinction in evaluating FS stipulations. All categorizations were made available to field offices for review and comment.

**Third, we meet- leasing and permit requirements are directly focused ON wind power production**

**Vann 12**

[Adam, Legislative Attorney, CRS Reports, “Wind Energy: Offshore Permitting”, 10.17, p. online//wyo-tjc]

As described above, **Section 388 of EPAct expands federal OCS leasing law to include wind energy production and sets forth procedures for granting a lease, easement, or right-of-way in federal water**s.57 However, Subsection (d) exempts certain actions from specific Section 388 requirements. This “savings provision” states that the law does not require the resubmittal of any document that was previously submitted or the reauthorization of any action that was previously authorized with respect to a project for which, before the date of enactment of this Act— (1) an offshore test facility has been constructed; or (2) a request for a proposal has been issued by a public authority. Thus, where a project has resulted from a public entity’s request for proposals or where a project is associated with an existing offshore test facility, previously submitted documents do not need to be resubmitted and previously authorized actions do not need to be reauthorized, essentially maintaining the status quo with respect to these projects.58 This provision does not seem to exempt unauthorized actions associated with the exempted actions, or, indeed, any other aspect of the related project, from a requirement to comply with the property interest acquisition provisions of Section 388. Thus, siting and construction of an offshore data tower, such as Cape Wind’s data tower in Nantucket Sound, would not have to be reauthorized. However, **any activity that had not been authorized before EPAct’s enactment on August 8, 2005**, such as the construction of additional facilities, **would appear to be subject to the requirements of Section 388**. Section 388 also contains two exceptions to the general requirement that a property interest issued under this provision be granted on a “competitive basis”: (1) if the Secretary of the Interior determines that there is no competitive interest, or (2) if the project meets certain criteria indicating a limited scope.

**Third, prefer our interpretation:**

#### Education- the leasing process and NEPA are the biggest components of energy production in the US and haven’t been discussed on previous energy topics whereas incentives and requirements have. Unique education outweighs recycling.

#### Err affirmative—the topic is massively neg-biased because of a lack of fed-key warrants and the states counterplan, and huge backfile generics because of past energy topics

#### Sixth, Competing interpretations is bad—comparisons are just as subjective as reasonability and their frame encourages a race to the bottom. We shouldn’t lose if our aff makes debate harder as long as it is still possible and educational

# Shipbuilding

**Shipbuilding is key to the economy, and competitiveness**

**NDU,06**

“National Defense Univeristy” The Industrial College of the Armed SHIPBUILDING 2006Forceshttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a475378.pdf, accessed 12/2/12,WYO/JF

**The U.S. shipbuilding industry is at a crossroads** – **it produces the best ships in the world, but at exorbitant prices that make the commercial sector uncompetitive** and limit the number of ships the U.S. Navy can afford. Since the industry is complex and has multiple constituencies, there are diverse economic, political, and military solutions that have competing interests. In order to provide a recommendation, the study team first considered the fundamental issue of whether **the U.S. needs to maintain an indigenous capability to manufacture ships**. Because of **the importance of the maritime domain to the nation, the U.S. should maintain an indigenous capability to build naval vessels. In addition to ensuring capability, keeping the industry in the U.S. provides economic and employment benefits, somewhat abating concerns over higher prices for U.S. built vessel**s. Thus, the team does not recommend laissez-faire. Based on discussions with personnel in Australia and consideration of the historical results achieved with government control of the “commanding heights,” the team does not recommend nationalization (one exception is that the U.S. should “nationalize” critical capabilities in danger of being lost, as the Portsmouth Navy Shipyard did for electric motor rewinding). Recommendations for each segment follow. Defense The primary recommendation for the defense segment is consolidation into two “super yards” for the construction of all naval vessels. To achieve this within ten years, officials should discuss the issue with industry representatives, and the USG should provide financial, contractual, and tax incentives to consolidate and reduce overhead and fixed costs. In addition, the government should oversee these efforts and all government support provided to the industry in order to ensure the best use of incentives to achieve desired results. The government should also consider consolidation of remaining U.S. Navy yards and maintenance facilities. In order to address industry’s concern with the lack of a stable procurement plan, the U.S. Navy, DoD, and Congress must commit to improvement. As a start, the U.S. should fully fund the CNO’s 313-ship initiative, and the U.S. Navy, government, and industry should use it as a foundation on which to develop a long-term business plan. To address the issues of change orders and technology insertion, the USN and industry should continue to develop the interchangeable mission modules concept (see Essay 1) and increase research and development funding in order to provide more mature technologies during construction. **Commercial Although not required for naval ship production or national security, a healthy commercial sector supports local economies, helps develop a supplier base, and sustains a skilled workforce.** The team recommends that the USG provide targeted support, such as tax incentives and use of government real estate, and fully fund the Title XI loan guarantee program for ten years. The government should also encourage expanded demand and production by implementing the U. S. Maritime Administration’s short sea shipping initiative. This initiative involves changing the current tax structure, which discourages movement of cargo by sea, and establishing a national maritime system with multi-mode ports. **If successful, this would create a new market for smaller vessels than those produced overseas. To support this, the U.S. should maintain the Jones Act for ten years to allow U.S. yards to become more competitive. In addition, the USG should not intervene if market forces cause further consolidation**.

**Costs won’t trade off with primacy-it’s cheap to maintain**

**Kagan 2012**

[Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, The World America Made, 2012 uwyo//amp]

What about the financial expense? **Many seem to believe that the cost of these deployments**, and of the armed forces generally, **is a major contributor to the soaring fiscal deficits that threaten the solvency of the national economy. But this is not the case**, either. As the former budget czar Alice Rivlin has observed, **the scary projec- tions of future deficits are not "caused by rising defense spending,"** much less by spending on foreign assistance.**125 The runaway deficits projected for the coming years are mostly the result of ballooning entitlement spending. Even the most draconian cuts in the defense budget would produce annual savings of only $50 billion to $100 billion**, a small fraction—between 4 and 8 percent—of the $1.5 trillion in annual deficits the United States is facing. In 2002, when Paul Kennedy was marveling at America's ability to remain **"the world's single superpower on the cheap," the United States was spending about 3.4 percent of GDP on defense. Today it is spending 4 percent, and in years to come, that is likely to head lower again— still "cheap" by historical standards. The cost of remaining the world's predominant power is not prohibitive.)**

**AMERICAN HARD POWER IS UNRIVALED—EXTREMELY HIGH**

**THAYER 2007**

[Bradley, (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) , American Empire: A Debate , P. 12-13 //wyo-tjc]

**The U.S. military is the best in the world and it has been so since end of World War II. No country has deployed its forces in so many countries and varied climates**-from the Arctic to the Antarctic-from below the sea to outer space. **No country is better able to fight wars of any type, from guerrilla conflicts to major campaigns on the scale of World War II. No country or likely alliance has the ability to defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield**. Thus, measured on either an absolute or relative (that is, comparing the U.S. military to the militaries of other countries) scale, **American military power is overwhelmin**g. Indeed, it is the greatest that it has ever been. This is not by accident. **The United States has worked assiduously, particu- larly since 1940, to produce the best military. The causes of American military predominance include extensive training and professional education, high morale, good military doctrine, frequency of use, learning from other mili- taries in the right circumstances, exceptional equipment and sound mainte- nance, and high levels of defense spending.**

**Err affirmative on time-frame alone. A collapse in the short-term causes a global shock because the world is not prepared for it, triggering our scenarios overnight**

**BRZEZINSKI (**National Security Advisor) **2004**

[Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York // wyo-tjc]

In reflecting on the security implications of this new reality, **it** is important to bear in mind the points made earlier. America is the world-transforming society, even revolutionary in its subversive impact in sovereignty-based international politics. At the same time, America is a traditional power, unilaterally protective of its own security while sustaining international stability not only for its own benefit, but for that of the international community as a whole. The latter task compels U.S. policymakers to concentrate on the more traditional U.S. role as the linchpin of global stability. Despite the new realities of global interdependence and the mounting preoccupation of the international community with such new global issues as ecology, global warming, AIDS, and poverty, the argument that American power is uniquely central to world peace is supported by a simple hypothetical test: **What would happen if the U.S**. Congress **were to mandate the prompt retraction of U.S. military power** from its three crucial foreign deployments—Europe, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf? **Any such U.S. withdrawal would without doubt plunge the world almost immediately into a** politically **chaotic crisis, In Europe, there would be a pell mell rush** by some **to rearm** but also to reach a special arrangement with Russia. **In the Far East, war would probably break out** on the Korean Peninsula **while Japan would undertake a rash program of rearmament, including nuclear weapons. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran would** become dominant and **would intimidate adjoining Arab states**. [P. 17]

**Inevitability is irrelevant because we will not survive the short-term collapse—that’s our 1AC scenarios and**

**Short-term withdraw causes destroys stability in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan—better to hold on as long as possible**

**MacDonald 9**

[Paul, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Columbia University, Daedalus, “Rebalancing American foreign policy”, 2009, p. asp]

**If the United States cannot retain its leading position** or easily reconstruct the postwar liberal order, **what options does it possess? One possibility would be for Washington to accept the erosion** of its hegemony **and simply withdraw from global affairs. But the short-term challenges** facing the United States, **such as** the worsening insurgency in **Afghanistan,** political **instability in Pakistan, and the Iranian nuclear crisis, limit the attractiveness of a rapid retreat** from global affairs. In addition, **just because the United States will face a more complicated** and fractious international **environment does not mean that its leadership will always be ineffective.** As Fareed Zakaria has argued, **the challenge is not one of American decline, but managing the "rise of the rest." (9) There may be distinct limits to American power** in the future, especially in regions where new economic or military rivals are increasing in strength. But the United States will still be able to work with these new regional powers on select issues of common interest.

**And, Indo-Pak war causes extinction**

**Washington Times 1**

July 8, LN.

**The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir**, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. **It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary**. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

**And the transition won’t be what their evidence describes—policy makers will cling to the myth of hegemony, Layne admits**

**Layne 10**

[Christopher, Professor of IR at Texas A&M, “The End of Pax Americana”, American Conservative, May 21, p. online]

That the United States needs a post-Pax Americana foreign policy should be obvious. But **there is no guarantee that the U.S. will adjust to a transforming world. Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations’ identity and place in world politics. More than most, America’s foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States’ hegemonic role**. To move successfully to a post-Pax Americana foreign policy, Americans will need to move beyond these myths. The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism, the belief, dating back to the Puritans, that the U.S. is different, better, and morally superior to the rest of the world. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war, imperialism, militarism, religious intolerance, non-democratic forms of governance, and latterly totalitarianism, genocide, and terrorism. All these bad things, we believe, come from “over there.” We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. U.S. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded, as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago, that the United States is a model for the world and “America’s wants and values are universal”—a point George W. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide “a prototypical solution for the world’s disorders.” If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States, all would be well. **These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. And because the U.S. looks through this prism, it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle. America’s security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible. Intervention is thus the United States’ default in foreign policy.**

**First, Econ scenario- A) WITHDRAWAL TO OFFSHORE BALANCING RISKS INSTABILITY THAT DESTROYS THE ECONOMY**

**THAYER** (Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State) **2006**

[Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy”, National Interest, Dec, p. asp //wyo-tjc]

**A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point** the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include **ensuring that critical resources like oil flow** around the world, **that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish** and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, **a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives** of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted**. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home"**, thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, **does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression**. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.

**B) Collapse of the economy results in EXTINCTION**

**BEARDEN** (Lt. Col in US Army) **2000**

[Thomas, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, p. online //wyo-tjc]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. **Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased** the intensity and number of their conflicts, **to the point where the arsenals of** weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**) now possessed by some 25 nations, **are almost certain to be released**. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. **The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere**, at least for many decades.

**Second, Prolif scenario A) TRANSITION TO OSB CAUSES prolif**

**THAYER** (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) **2007**

[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 109 //wyo-tjc]

It is important to know what other countries think of the United States, but, equally, **it is a fundamental mistake to worry disproportionately about what the rest of the world thinks**. Leaders lead. That may be unpopular at times, indeed, perhaps most of the time. A cost of leadership is that the leader will be criticized for doing too much, or for accomplishing too little. **But at the same time, few states would want to replace the leadership of the United States** with the leadership of China. The allies of the United States are precisely its allies because to be so serves the interests of these countries. One country does not align itself with another for reasons of sentiment or emotion. **If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many** of those **allies would terminate their relationship** with the United States. They would **be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and** perhaps **ally against the United States**, even a**iming their nuclear weapons at the United States**. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse off than it is now~ **That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy**. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It weilds enormous influence in interna- tional institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it.

**B) That leads to MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WARS**

**TOTTEN** (Assoc. Professor at University of Arkansas) **1994**

[Samuel, The Widening Circle of Genocide, p. 289 //wyo-tjc]

**There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including** but not limited to the following: the possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to the use of its nuclear weapons; the **miscalculation** of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack; **a nuclear weapons accident** due to carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the **use** of such weapons **by an unstable leader; the use** of such weapons **by renegade military personnel** during a period of instability (personal, national or international); and, **the theft** (and/or development) **and use of such weapons by terrorists**. While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.

**Third, CHALLENGERS: A) OSB INVITES THREATS**

**THAYER** (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) **2007**

[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 105-6 //wyo-tjc]

Second, U.S. power protects the United States. That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement about international politics as ~one can make. **International politics is not a game or a sport. There are no "time outs**," there ls no halffime and no rest. lt never stops. **There ls no hidlng from threats and dangers** in international politics. If there Is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States Is what protects the country from such threats**. Simply by declar- ing that the United States is going home~ thus abandoning its commitments or making half pledges** to defend its interests and allies, **does not mean that others will respect its wishes to retreat In fact, to make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the ani- mal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak** rather than confront the strong. The **same is true in the anarchic realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong** and does not actively protect and advance its interests, **other countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itself**

**hegemony produces global stability necessary for civilization: Collapse causes a new dark age—overpopulation, disease, bio-weapons**

**Starobin 6**

[Paul, editior of National Journal, The National Journal, “Beyond Hegemony”, 12.2.2006, p. lexis]

**The grimmest possibility is a 21st-century global version of the Dark Ages** that afflicted Christian Europe after the fall of Rome in the 5th century. In The Coming Anarchy, a 1994 Atlantic Monthly essay, the writer Robert D. Kaplan held out West Africa as a premonition of the future -- the "symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger." **It will be a world of "disease, overpopulation ... the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security** firms, and international drug cartels," as already characterizes West Africa. **And a world of 21st-century chaos, it can be added, is one in which 21st-century barbarians might have access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons**.

# K Top Shelf

**The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.**

**Second, is reasons to prefer:**

**(\_\_\_) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac**

 **(\_\_\_) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another**

#### Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity

#### Predictions aren’t perfect but need to be made

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, <http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses>, accessed 12/12/12,WYO?JF

Will Mearsheimer’s prediction come true? His confidence is clear in the bluntness of his claim: “Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no.”63 Predictions of this certainty are not commonly found in international relations, especially not in contexts of such complexity and importance as the next few decades of East Asian security. Of course only time will tell, and Mearsheimer himself admits that the nature of social science does not allow for perfect predictive power.64 Yet one can still assess the strength of the claim in terms of both the substance of the prediction and the ability of theories to make such predictions more generally. This chapter makes that assessment, evaluating several other theoretical positions and the strengths and weaknesses they have relative to offensive realism.

**Realism is inevitable—states will always seek to maximize power**

John **Mearsheimer**, Professor, University of Chicago, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS, **2001**, p. 2.

The sad fact is that **international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business**, and **it is likely to remain that wa**y. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, **great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states.** But **great powers** do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their **ultimate aim is to be the hegemon**-that is, **the only great power in the system.**

#### No agent to the alt- that’s bad for debate, kills education because the 2AC can’t make offensive answers to the actor, strat skew- allows them to shift out of offense and say it doesn’t link- voter for fairness and education.

**Extinction is the worst impact—prioritizing anything else puts the cart before the horse**

**Schell** **1982**

(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the **predicament. I have pointed out that our** species is the most important of all **the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For** **the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room,** or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

# Security 2AC

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara **McCormack, ’10**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Alternative fails—state coopts it. Only perm solves

Tara **McCormack, 10**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 137-138)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

#### No root cause of war

Moore, 04 **[**Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2]

**If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war**? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. **Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion**. **The reality**, **however**, **is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression**. **It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war**. And **the same may also be true of democide**. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 **Certainly** if we were able to press a button **and** end **poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so**. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. **No one**, however, **has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace."** Further, **given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.** A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior CONTINUED - NO TEXT REMOVED... MOORE CONTINUED - NO TEXT REMOVED... on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. **HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms**. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. **No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables**. **We should insist**, however, **on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs**. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

# CP

**Conditionality is bad:**

**Time Skew: allows them to neutralize large chunks of 2ac time, hurting 1AR strat. The 2AC matters most because it puts out all the arguments that the aff can go.**

**Decrease Education: multiple worlds cause muddled debates that preclude consistency of education.**

**Voting issue: for ground, fairness, and education.**

**Sea Power is key to keep Indo-Pak cooperation intact**

**Cropsey, 12**

Dr. Seth Cropsey Hudson Institute “The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security” <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf>, accessed 12/20/12,WYO/JF

Finally **there are the consequences if U.S. seapower continues to decrease and proves unable to meet even the reduced goals it has set for itself. History is a good guide**. Nations in the middle like to side with the winner. **During our Civil War British political leadership considered recognizing the Confederacy** **but was** eventually **dissuaded by Union** military success. In World War II Sweden declared neutrality but grew increasingly amenable to Allied requests as Germany’s military position worsened. **Romania initially sided with Germany in the same war but changed sides following U.S. attacks on their oil fields** and a coup that deposed the pro German dictator, Antonescu. Bulgarians followed a similar path from siding with the Nazis to switching their allegiance to the Allies in 1944. Saudi Prince Bandar, acknowledging China’s increasing international prominence and power visited Beijing last year and met with President Hu. **American weakness at sea, especially in the Indo-Pacific will change the current military, diplomatic, and commercial character of the region.** **Whether the U.S. fleet shrinks because of too little funding or because unreformed procurement practices have raised the price of ships or because ships have been called home to save on operational expense, the result is the same. While we were once present in strength, we would be no more**.

**Indo-Pak war causes extinction**

**Washington Times 1**

July 8, LN.

**The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir**, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. **It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary**. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

**U.S. seapower is key to deter Chinese hegemony and war in the south china sea**

**Cropsey, 12**

Dr. Seth Cropsey Hudson Institute “The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security” <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf>, accessed 12/20/12,WYO/JF

A nation burdened with massive debt whose ability to shape world events has been limited in tandem with its capacity to invest in research and technology will have more and more trouble finding markets. **China’s potential hegemony would not only force its neighbors’ to reconsider whether the U.S. is a reliable ally. It would also become an increasingly powerful magnet for trade** in the region—**at the expense of U.S. commerce. Unlike the U.S. whose seapower has protected global sea lanes that other states have used to their benefit China** has a different set of values. It views with suspicion a liberal trading system notwithstanding the benefits received from it. **China’s friends include Iran and North Korea. Beijing is a poor candidate to support the international order that has been the keel of U.S. foreign and security policy** for a century. **Waning U.S. seapower is an invitation that China will regard as a complement to its rising military and navy in particular. It foreshadows a coercive resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea**, the likelihood of an increased regional arms race, and the troubling international perception that the U.S. is—or has—abandoned its role as a great power. American seapower is the strategic keel of our foreign and security policy. **Reducing it would be an exercise of history-making shortsightedness. Restoring it would be an act of statesmanship from which Americans and all who cherish political liberty would benefit for the remainder of this century. Thank you.**

**CONFLICT IN THE SCS ESCALATES TO FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR**

STRAITS TIMES 1995

[staff, “Choose Your Own Style of Democracy”, May 21, p. ln// wyo-tjc]

In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia.

**In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes** between Asian countries **over the Spratly Islands** because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. **In this scenario, the United States would offer to help** and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. **Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a full-scale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.**

# Fiscal Cliff

#### GOP will not budge over the debt limit

CNN, 1/4

“Debt ceiling: Welcome to Fight Club” <http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/04/news/economy/debt-ceiling/?hpt=hp_t2>, accessed 1/4/13,WYO/JF

Brinksmanship over the debt ceiling could make the fiscal cliff standoff look like child's play. Right after the House passed the [fiscal cliff compromise](http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/01/news/economy/fiscal-cliff-senate-bill/index.html?iid=EL), President Obama said, "I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they've already racked up through the laws that they passed." But [Republicans continue to insist](http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/04/politics/obama-congress/index.html?iid=EL) that any increase in the [debt](http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/04/news/economy/debt-ceiling/?hpt=hp_t2) ceiling must be [exceeded](http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/15/news/economy/boehner-debt-ceiling/index.htm?iid=EL) by spending cuts and entitlement reforms. "[The president] doesn't even want to have a discussion about it because he knows this is where we have leverage," Sen. Pat Toomey said on MSNBC earlier this week. "We absolutely have to have this fight over the debt limit."

#### Boehner is rallying the GOP for an all-out fight on debt ceiling

L.A. Times, 1/4

“Boehner promises Republicans he'll fight Obama over debt ceiling” [http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-boehner-debt-ceiling-20130104,0,6606556.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-boehner-debt-ceiling-20130104%2C0%2C6606556.story), accessed 1/4/13,WYO/JF

In the first closed-door meeting of the Republican majority in the new [Congress](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/u.s.-congress-ORGOV0000131.topic), newly reelected House Speaker [John A. Boehner](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/john-boehner-PEPLT007549.topic) on Friday promised a robust fight with [President Obama](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/barack-obama-PEPLT007408.topic) to cut spending in exchange for raising the nation’s debt limit. The Ohio Republican doubled-down on his insistence that there must be at least a dollar-per-dollar match between spending reductions and continued borrowing. “With the cliff behind us, the focus turns to spending,” Boehner said, according to a source in the room who requested anonymity to discuss the private meeting. “The president says he isn’t going to have a debate with us over the debt ceiling. He also says he’s not going to cut spending along with the debt limit hike.” [PHOTOS: What to look forward to in politics for 2013](http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-politics-look-ahead-2013-20130102%2C0%2C6077491.photogallery) On the heels of the divisive “[fiscal cliff](http://www.latimes.com/topic/fiscal-cliff/EVBAE00011.topic)” battle over the automatic tax increases and spending cuts that briefly went into effect at the beginning of the year, Boehner is launching a new budget fight. Treasury Secretary [Timothy Geithner](http://www.latimes.com/topic/economy-business-finance/economy/timothy-geithner-PEPLT0000017540.topic) notified Congress earlier this week that the nation has already hit its $16-trillion debt limit, and Congress will be asked soon to raise the borrowing authority to continue paying the nation's bills. Geithner can take temporary measures to pay creditors for several weeks. Without lifting the debt limit, the federal government would face a cataclysmic default on it already accrued obligations -- akin to stopping payments on a mortgage or credit card debt. Boehner and his [GOP](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/parties-movements/republican-party-ORGOV0000004.topic) allies in the Senate, including Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), are setting up a repeat of the budget wars that defined the last Congress, and led to a cycle of brinkmanship and crisis. McConnell made similar remarks in the Senate as the new Congress was sworn in.

#### Gun control and immigration thump agenda- top priority for 2013.

Weber 1/1

(Joseph, Fox News, “Guns, immigration, fiscal issues emerge as top priorities for Obama, new Congress,” January 1, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/01/gun-control-immigration-reform-fiscal-issues-emerge-as-top-issues-for-new///wyo-mm)

After an election year in which legislative business practically ground to a halt, Congress is poised to make up for lost time in 2013. The new Congress will begin its next session with an agenda expected to focus largely on issues that re-emerged over the past several weeks and months, with gun legislation and immigration reform near the top.

#### Immigrations and tax reform thump the disad, includes energy policies

Davenport, 12

(Coral, “How Obama and Congress Could Find Common Ground on Energy,” http:~/~/www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/[com/magazine/how-obama-and-congress-could-find-common-ground-on-energy-20121206](http://opencaselist.paperlessdebate.com/xwiki/bin/create///www.nationaljournal/com/magazine/how-obama-and-congress-could-find-common-ground-on-energy-20121206?parent=Mary+Washington.McCleary%2DMcElhinny+Aff), accessed 1/3/12,WYO/JF

One big obstacle is time. A second-term president has about two years to push through major legislation before the next presidential campaign begins. In addition, two huge issues are already on the docket: immigration and tax reform. A sweeping overhaul of the nation’s tax code, which could easily absorb Congress through 2014, offers the first opportunity for major energy reform. Some lawmakers will probably insert a carbon-tax swap proposal in a broader tax-reform package, although for now the carbon tax seems unlikely to succeed. Democrats will also try to end tax breaks for the oil industry while extending those for renewable energy. But if the tax-reform debate ends without comprehensive new energy provisions, it may be too late to enact an energy overhaul. “If President Obama has victories on immigration and the deficit, that’s two potentially momentous victories for the president in a second term, where victories are not typical,” says historian Alfred Zacher, author of Trial and Triumph: Presidential Power in the Second Term. “It’s difficult to believe he’d win three.”

#### Non-unique PTC just got an extension takes out the Link to the disad

Recharge News, 1-1

“'Fiscal cliff' deal includes lifeline for wind power PTC, say reports”, <http://www.rechargenews.com/business_area/politics/article330152.ece>, accessed 1-1-13,WYO/JF

The wind production tax credit (PTC) could survive under a deal hammered out by US politicians to stop the nation’s economy falling off the so-called “fiscal cliff”, according to reports in Washington. The PTC would be extended for one year to the end of 2013 under the agreement reached late on New Year's Eve, allowing projects that begin construction during that time to qualify for the incentive, says Reuters.

#### ITC just passed and Obama supports it—should have triggered the disad

Kessler 3 Jan

[Kessler, Richard A.: U.S. Online Editor at Recharge Newspaper. "In Depth: Tax credit may allow US offshore wind lift-off in 2013." *Recharge Politics*. Recharge, 3 Jan 2013. Web. 3 Jan 2013. <http://www.rechargenews.com/business\_area/politics/article330202.ece>. //Wyo-BF]

 By extending the renewable energy investment tax credit (ITC) one year through 31 December on more favorable terms for developers, Congress has increased chances that construction of the first US offshore wind projects can begin in 2013, industry leaders tell Recharge. They believe that CapeWind, which has 77.5% of its proposed 468MW nameplate capacity under long-term contract, and Deepwater Wind’s 30MW Block Island demonstration project off Rhode Island with full output sold, will start being built this year. Developer Energy Management Inc. is believed to be scheduling a 2013 construction start. “Extension of the ITC is an extremely positive step for the wind industry in general and for Block Island,” says Deepwater Wind chief executive Jeffrey Grybowski. Last year, it submitted final state and federal permit applications for the project. He notes it is important that Congress recognizes offshore wind as a new industry that merits continued support through the tax code. Construction work is also possible this year on Fishermen’s Energy 25-30MW pilot project 2.8 miles (4.5km) off Atlantic City, New Jersey, if the developer can find a power buyer and win state eligibility for taxpayer financing through an offshore wind renewable energy credit (OREC) programme. Fishermen’s Energy spokeswoman Rhonda Jackson says the ITC extension helps give the project momentum and will allow the state to “capture the economic benefits of offshore wind at a significantly lower cost.” These include creation of hundreds of jobs and new manufacturing capacity. The move was part of a last-minute political compromise late Tuesday on fiscal measures that allow the US to avoid automatic and deep spending cuts by the deficit-ridden federal government. The bill, which President Barack Obama says he will sign into law, changes eligibility to offshore wind projects that begin construction before ITC expiration from those under the prior law that had been “placed in service.” The ITC, which provides developers with a credit equivalent to 30% their project costs, has been available since Obama took office in 2009. None have been able to qualify given long project lead times and lengthy federal permitting delays.

#### Regulation changes to coal and other power plants trigger the link

Reuters, 12/30

“EPA faces legal battles, might take easy confirmation road” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/30/epa-legal-idUSL1E8NS69Y20121230>, accessed 1/2/13,WYO/JF

Regardless of who takes the reins, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency will likely face continued legal battles in President Barack Obama's second term as it tries to finalize pollution rules for power plants, analysts said. EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, who spearheaded the [Obama](http://www.reuters.com/video/reuters-tv?videoId=237536565&videoChannel=118066&lc=int_mb_1001) administration's regulation of carbon emissions, said on Thursday she will step down after almost four years. Her tenure was marked by opposition from industry groups and Republican lawmakers to the EPA's first-ever crackdown on carbon emissions, as well as other anti-pollution measures. Analysts said whoever succeeds Jackson will probably face a spate of lawsuits to challenge rules that the EPA will finalize governing power plants, industrial sources and oil and gas production. "This is shaping up to be four years of litigation," said Christopher Guith, vice president for policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Energy Institute. Given the partisan divide, Guith said, legislators would struggle to draft laws that could serve as alternatives to the EPA's pending suite of carbon and air regulation.

#### Obama will not use PC he will cave to what the GOP wants to get them on board

Catherine Poe, 1/2

Read more: <http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/ad-lib/2013/jan/2/debt-ceiling-president-obama-draws-line-sand/#ixzz2GqnhmxZH>, accessed 1/2/13,WYO/JF
Let’s hope so, but progressives and liberals aren’t holding their breath. Didn’t he run on never, ever caving on taxes at the $250,000 mark? Yet he just did, moving the taxable rate to $400,000 on individuals and $450,000 for households. And Obama was holding all the cards. If the Republicans wanted to plunge over the fiscal cliff and raise everyone’s taxes, then so be it. Obama didn’t have to budge. But he did. So why should we believe him this time?

#### Offshore wind is bi-partisan

NAW, 11

North American Wind “New Bipartisan Legislation Proposes Offshore Wind Energy Tax Credit” <http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.8790>, accessed 11/7/12,WYO/JF

U.S. Reps. Bill Pascrell Jr., D-N.J., and Frank LoBiondo, R-N.J., [have introduced](http://pascrell.house.gov/list/press/nj08_pascrell/pr101820112.shtml) bipartisan legislation to encourage offshore wind power investment off the coast of New Jersey. The Incentivizing Offshore Wind Power Act (H.R.3238) proposes to provide a 30%tax credit on investment in the first 3,000 MW of offshore wind. The secretary of the Treasury would have to consult with the secretaries of Energy and the Interior when establishing this credit.

**Winners win**

**Marshall and Prins 11**

(BRYAN W, Miami University and BRANDON C, University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy, “Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force”, Sept, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3)

Presidents rely heavily on Congress in converting their political capital into real policy success. Policy success not only shapes the reelection prospects of presidents, but it also builds the president’s reputation for political effectiveness and fuels the prospect for subsequent gains in political capital (Light 1982). Moreover, the president’s legislative success in foreign policy is correlated with success on the domestic front. On this point, some have largely disavowed the two-presidencies distinction while others have even argued that foreign policy has become a mere extension of domestic policy (Fleisher et al. 2000; Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989) Presidents implicitly understand that there exists a linkage between their actions in one policy area and their ability to affect another. The use of force is no exception; in promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad, presidential decisions are made with an eye toward managing political capital at home (Fordham 2002).

#### Obama/treasury will circumvent debt celing'

H.P, 1/4

“Harry Reid Would Back Obama If He Bucks GOP On Debt Ceiling: Source”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/04/harry-reid-obama-debt-ceiling_n_2410557.html>, accessed 1/4/14,WYO/JF

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has privately told other Democrats, including President Obama, that if the administration used its constitutional and executive authority to continue paying its debts in the face of House Republican opposition, he would support the approach, according to a source familiar with Reid's message to the president. The simplest escape route out of the debt ceiling impasse is for the president to direct the Treasury to find a legal way to pay its debts. The Treasury then has a variety of options. One gaining particular attention relies on a law that allows the Treasury to mint a coin of unspecified value and [deposit](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/04/harry-reid-obama-debt-ceiling_n_2410557.html) it with the Federal Reserve. Those funds could then be used legally to pay debts. "Reid has not dismissed any option," said the source close to Reid. The 14th Amendment states that "the validity of the public [debt](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/04/harry-reid-obama-debt-ceiling_n_2410557.html) of the United States, authorized by law ... shall not be questioned." Last month, White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters that "[t]his administration does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the president the power to ignore the debt ceiling -- period." It would be possible, however, for that statement to be true and for the president to pay the debts by citing 14th Amendment powers. If the president went the route of the so-called "platinum coin," he could use the 14th Amendment to tell Congress that the constitution gives him no choice but to find all legal ways to honor the "validity of the public debt." The Treasury could legally mint a coin worth enough to cover debts for several years and deposit that coin with the Federal Reserve. The funds would not be used for spending that isn't authorized and appropriated by Congress, but only to pay debts. The president, therefore, would not be ignoring the debt ceiling, because there would be no new debt subject to the limit. On Monday, Reid again raised the 14th Amendment with the president in a conversation about the deal struck between Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and Vice President Joe Biden. Reid noted that Obama would soon need to ask House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) for a $2 trillion hike in the debt ceiling, and Boehner would likely demand drastic cuts. "What do you do? You already took the 14th Amendment off the table," Reid said, according to notes of the call.

#### No real impact to downgraded credit rating

Business Week, 12/31

“The Cliff Is Not a Credit-Rating Crisis” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-31/the-cliff-is-not-a-credit-rating-crisis>, accessed 1/1/13,WYO/JF

In August 2011, you’ll recall, amid the debt-ceiling debacle, Standard & Poor’s ([MHP](http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/snapshot/snapshot.asp?ticker=MHP)) did the unthinkable and [downgraded the U.S. credit rating](http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563). Did the dollar collapse? Treasuries plunge? Bond vigilantes with pitchforks maraud down the corridors of Wall Street? Just the opposite: By dint of the dollar being the global reserve-currency of choice—and Treasuries being the ultimate redoubt of safety and liquidity—U.S. bond prices rose and yields fell while our printing presses went full-tilt. Risk on or risk off, creditors the world over can’t seem to get enough of American debt.

#### Downgrades will happen regardless of the bill and what congress decides to do

Daily Mail Reporter, 12/30
Investors fear another US downgrade next year despite last-minute talks Read more: <http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-2254984/Investors-fear-US-downgrade-year-despite-minute-talks.html#ixzz2GleV3HQZ>, accessed 1/1/13,WYO/JF

A downgrade remains a distinct possibility as the US displays an ongoing reluctance to tackle the longer-term budget issues.’ The US lost its prized triple A credit rating after a political row over its debt ceiling in 2011, with rating agency Standard and Poor’s downgrading it to AA-plus. Investors fear a repeat performance, with another cut causing stock market panic and hurting confidence. Rick Patel, a US bond fund manager at Fidelity, said: ‘Regardless of the outcome of negotiations…downgrades are likely to follow across the rating agencies.’

#### Economic collapse does not cause war—their historical arguments are wrong

Ferguson 6

(Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

**Nor can economic crises explain** the **bloodshed**. What may be **the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to** the rise of **fascism and** the outbreak of **World War II. But** that simple story leaves too much out. **Nazi Germany started the war** in Europe **only after its economy** had **recovered. Not all** the **countries affected by the** Great **Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars** of aggression. In fact, **no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible** for the century as a whole. **Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.**

#### This isn’t a repeat of the 30’s

Zakaria 9 (Faree, PhD in Political Science from Harvard, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, December 12, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425>)

Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.